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Abstract
On 27 September 2013, the Centre for the Humanities and Health (CHH) at King’s College
London hosted a 1-day workshop on ‘Medical knowledge, Medical Duties’. This workshop
was the fifth in a series of five workshops whose aim is to provide a new model for
high-quality, open interdisciplinary engagement between medical professionals and phi-
losophers. This report identifies the key points of discussion raised throughout the day and
the methodology employed.
Introduction
On 27 September 2013, the Centre for the Humanities and Health
(CHH) at King’s College London1 hosted a 1-day workshop on
‘Medical Knowledge, Medical Duties’. This workshop was the fifth
in a series of five workshops whose aim is to provide a new model
for high-quality, open interdisciplinary engagement between
medical professionals and philosophers. Previous workshops
focused on concepts of health and disease [1], personhood and iden-
tity in medicine [2], death [3] and bodies and minds in medicine [4].
The workshop used the methodology developed over the course
of the workshop series, adopting the following six characteristics:
(1) more time devoted to plenary discussion than to introductory
speakers; (2) matched multidisciplinary introductions providing
two points of view on each topic, with the philosopher following
on from, and commenting on, the health care professional;
(3) equal participation of all participants in a plenary chaired
discussion – that is, not merely a question/answer session – facili-
tated by preparatory reading and a rotating chair; (4) a physical
roundtable format and strict limits on the numbers of participants;
(5) a diverse and balanced group of participants with strong con-
tinuity among participants in the different workshops of the series;
and (6) the use of the following discussion conventions: the ‘Can-
berra rules’ (a method for differentiating comments that introduce
a new topic for discussion and comments that are on an existing
line of discussion) and ‘pink jargon/clarification card’ (signalling
the use of disciplinary jargon in need of clarification). More details
on this methodology and why/how we arrived at it are reported
here [1,2]. We consider this methodology crucial to the success of
our workshops, and believe that it could be usefully employed in
other settings.
Over 40 participants attended the workshop (20 women and 21
men) with around half having attended previous workshops. The
demographic of the workshop matched that in previous years:
roughly one-third of the participants came from outside of the UK
and the group as a whole was evenly divided between clinical and
humanities backgrounds. Background reading material was dis-
tributed to the attendees before the event in order to facilitate
discussion [5–11].
1 http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/groups/chh/. Funded by a Wellcome
Trust Strategic Award (Number 086071).
The copyright line for this article was changed on 1 February 2016 after
original online publication.
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Session 1: public and private goods
The first session was opened by Professor Trisha Greenhalgh (Pro-
fessor of Primary Health Care and Dean for Research Impact, Barts
and the London School of Medicine and Dentistry). Greenhalgh
defined public goods as goods that are non-rival and non-
excludable. Non-rival means that my use of a good does not
diminish your ability to use it, and non-excludable means that we
cannot in practice stop people from partaking in it. A classic
example is clean air; my use of clean air does not diminish your use
of it, and if we have clean air, we cannot exclude individuals from
benefitting from it [12]. Public health and health care, Greenhalgh
suggested, have many characteristics of being a public good, and
this provides a useful framework to understand certain problems.
Often, Greenhalgh contended, health care administrators and
users experience a conflict between doing what is in their private
best interest and doing what contributes to the public good. This
raises philosophical and ethical difficulties with protecting public
goods. Greenhalgh gave several examples.
First, during a chickenpox outbreak, Greenhalgh’s general prac-
titioner (GP) practice employed two separate waiting rooms as a
means of limiting contagion and protecting public health: one for
patients with (suspected) chickenpox and one for patients without.
Patients with unconfirmed cases of chickenpox, however, were
reluctant to wait in the former. For while it was in the public
interest that they wait in that room, it was against their private
interest; since they might not have the virus, waiting in that room
would increase their exposure risk.
Another example focussed on the introduction of the ‘summary
care record’. This is a national programme to put a summary of
patients’ medical details on a central database, which would be
particularly useful for quick access during emergency and out-of
hour’s care. Greenhalgh argued that GP’s did not cooperate with
the introduction of this programme because the uploading and
reorganization of their own data was burdensome, costly and time-
consuming – and thus against their private interest. Those very
same GPs, however, felt that the summary care record would be of
great use to them in out-of-hour’s surgery. This, Greenhalgh said,
is a classic example of a ‘free rider’ problem. Because public
goods, such as the summary database, are non-excludable, agents
will benefit from it whether they contribute to the maintenance of
the public good or not. Where this individual contribution is indi-
vidually costly, therefore, agents do not have much incentive to
make that contribution.
In the final example, Greenhalgh focused on the nature of global
public goods in relation to global communicable disease control.
Greenhalgh noted that because of a lack of access to health care, an
increase in male human trafficking across southern African coun-
tries has led to a huge increase in tuberculosis and HIV in the
population. Greenhalgh suggested that the solution to this public
health crisis would require a collaborative effort between the
affected countries to provide health care to its populations. This
solution, however, raises the possibility of entire countries acting
as ‘free riders’; populations may benefit from access to health care
in other countries even if their country of origin refuses to con-
tribute to this particular public good.
Dr John William Devine (Adjunct Assistant Professor, Depart-
ment of Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin) focussed on the moral
mandate for flu vaccinations for health care providers (HCP).
Maintaining high vaccination levels, which provides ‘herd immun-
ity’, is an important public good: it is not so much my own
immunity post-vaccination that protects me from infection, as my
being part of a vaccinated population in which infections are
unlikely to be transmitted or take hold [13]. The key point here is
that HCP themselves are unlikely to benefit from a flu vaccination
as they are mostly young and healthy. Instead, the key beneficiaries
of their vaccination are their vulnerable patients in whom vacci-
nation may not generate sufficient immunity, and who rely on
others not to pass the virus on.
The moral case in favour of vaccinating HCP is clear, and Devine
listed three further reasons why HCP ought to get vaccinated: (1)
The flu vaccine is not too invasive, very safe and inexpensive; (2)
HCP have a special responsibility to promote their patients’ health
and a duty to do no harm; and (3) HCP might have an obligation to
act as ‘role models’ and thus set an example with regard to immun-
ization. Nevertheless, on average, less than 50% of HCP voluntarily
consent to receiving the flu vaccine. How, Devine wondered, can
this rate be increased? He explored three possible programmes: (1)
mandatory vaccinations; (2) voluntary vaccination; and an (3)
integrated programme for increasing compliance.
A mandatory programme would demand vaccination as part of
the terms and conditions of employment. This would be inexpen-
sive as no money would be spent on advertising, education or
persuasion and it would be effective. Still, two main arguments
count against it. First, it seems wrong to force people to receive
injections. Second, it may affect our health care system for the
worse by undermining its culture of trust and creating disaffected
or resentful staff. We should not strive for mere compliance,
Devine pointed out, but for endorsed compliance.
A voluntary programme fosters willing compliance by taking
steps to persuade staff of the importance of the vaccine, and by
making the vaccine easily obtainable. The advantage of this pro-
gramme is that it avoids the problem of disaffected staff and
interfering with autonomy, but its big drawback is that past experi-
ence suggests it is unlikely to result in high levels of compliance.
As a third option, Devine advocated for an integrated pro-
gramme that has characteristics of both voluntary and mandatory
programmes. The integrated programme draws upon education
and persuasion to ensure that people mostly comply willingly, but
also sees a role for mandatory vaccination where people do not
comply willingly. This, Devine said, would increase vaccination
rates without compromising autonomy (too much).
Much of the following discussion focused on Devine’s endorse-
ment of an integrated programme for compulsory vaccination of
HCP. A central concern was that the strategy was not substantially
different from enforced compliance and thus failed to respect
autonomy – given that informed refusals ultimately would be
rejected. The eventual enforcement might still lead to disaffection
and distrust among health care staff, and might also make the
attempt at persuasive techniques seem farcical and patronizing. In
response, Devine argued that the aim of the integrated programme
was to provide staff with the opportunity to reflect and voluntarily
comply, reducing the amount of coercion involved overall.
In support of Devine’s proposal, some argued that the integrated
model struck the balance right: it would offer HCP the ability to
‘own’ their decision to receive the vaccine, thereby encouraging a
higher level of compliance and perhaps even increased identifica-
tion with and trust within the health care system. Another
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suggestion was that enforcement can have a positive role in persua-
sion: smoking bans were deeply unpopular when they first came
into effect, precisely for reasons to do with autonomy. But now that
they have been in place for a while, they are widely supported.
Some participants rejected the very idea that respect for
autonomy should be such a central concern in the debate. While
respect for autonomy is important, the compromise to autonomy
within this policy is minimal; vaccinations would not be manda-
tory to all, but only a condition for getting a health care job. Many
jobs have certain restrictions on what staff can do and require
sacrifices. This is acceptable because people do not have a right to
a (health care) job. In this context, it is important to remember that
HCP are not just doctors and nurses; they also include, say, clean-
ers, catering staff, receptionists, technical staff, etc. While the
former may have health-related ‘professional obligations’, that is
less clear in the case of the latter.
A further point of contention raised in discussion related to the
evidence base for flu vaccines. Not everyone agreed that there was
convincing rationale for such programmes, and HCP – they argued
– have a professional obligation to criticize non-evidence-based
policy, as well as a professional obligation to set a good example.
Another point raised was that because the effectiveness of flu
vaccines varies annually, and because the harms and benefits of
individual (non) vaccination depends on baseline vaccination rates
– which vary a lot between different health care groups – the force
of coercion should at least vary with and be sensitive to these
aspects.
Participants also discussed Greenhalgh’s framework for consid-
ering health care problems in terms of conflicts between public
goods and private interests. It was noticed that the notion of public
good is ambiguous; Greenhalgh’s definition is one used by econo-
mists, who are interested in scarcity, distribution and competition.
But is that the best or even a suitable definition? What about goods
that are not costly to oneself but that are simply enhanced by the
activity of others? An example of this is singing in a choir. A wider
conception of public goods may be necessary to accommodate, for
example, the benefits of designing less lonely cities, or cycle lanes.
In neither case does the concept of a ‘free rider’ make sense, for
example, and both are important for physical and mental health. It
was also suggested that thinking about private and public goods
may be useful in thinking about health itself, which has character-
istics of being both a private good – one’s health is directly tied to
one’s own interest – and a public good – one’s health affects other
people’s health in myriad ways, and other people’s wallets through
a nationalized health care and social security system.
Finally it was noted that Greenhalgh’s example of the summary
record was not just a case of public good versus private interest; as
with the case of vaccinations, doctors may have had legitimate and
non-selfish concerns about the programme, such as its perceived
threat to confidentiality and patients’ privacy.
Session 2: expertise and obligation
The session was opened by Dr Peter Freedman (Consultant Physi-
cian, Homerton University Hospital, London). Dr Freedman pro-
vided a comprehensive account of the historical use of the
Hippocratic Oath. A central focus of the introduction was on how
striking it is that reference is still made to a body of words formu-
lated around 2400 years ago [14]. At the same time, Freedman
pointed out, we should be wary of thinking that the Hippocratic
Oath has been immutable or not open to interpretation: the Oath was
co-opted by the medical profession when Catholicism was domi-
nant, for example, and at this point, its reference to pagan gods was
omitted. The Oath has also undergone multiple translations [15,16].
At present, the Hippocratic Oath is no longer (or at least not
very widely) used formally, but its central tenets have more or less
influenced many modern-day codes of medical ethics. These
central features are the duty to benefit the patient and to avoid
harm, which are now instantiated in international codes of medical
ethics [17,18] and most recently in guidance from the General
Medical Council (2013) [19]. Freedman raised the following
points for discussion: whether taking an oath or a pledge is more
effective than the imposition of a set of rules to which no explicit
reference is made in an oath, and whether or not the Hippocratic
Oath in either ancient or modern forms is still relevant.
Dr Emma Bullock (Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Concepts
of Health, Philosophy Department, King’s College London)
argued that rather than rejecting the oath as outmoded, it must be
reinterpreted in order to be applied in modern ethical codes. One
way of understanding the duty of care (derived from the Hippo-
cratic Oath) is that medical practitioners are obliged to protect
and/or promote the well-being of their patients through informed
consent procedures. Specifically, she focused on claims made by
Veatch [9] and Tännsjö [20] that complying with patients’ free
choice is the best means of discharging the duty of care since it
protects the patient’s well-being as she conceives of it.
Bullock provided two objections to this particular reformula-
tion: the existence of epistemic handicaps and the maleficence of
promoting patient free choice. By the term epistemic handicap,
Bullock meant that patients may not be in the best position to know
what they want or what promotes their well-being. In defence of
this, Bullock cited evidence that patients suffer from cognitive
biases and impairments – such as weakness of will, being subject
to peer pressure and poorly judging the risk posed by a treatment
option [21–23]. By maleficence of promoting choice, Bullock
meant that the mere provision of information and/or choice can be
detrimental to a patient’s well-being [24,25]. For instance, the
provision of genetic information can lead to stigmatization,
psychological harm and discrimination [26]. The provision of
choice can be discomforting and undesirable because patients may
not want to choose, or in cases where the options available to the
patent may be so unappealing that she lacks any preferences
towards a particular treatment option at all.
Having rejected Veatch’s reformulation of the duty of care as
following patients’ free choice, Bullock suggested two alternative
options: first, a model that better balances patient autonomy with
real concerns about the duty of care as highlighted above. This
might include the provision of waiving informed consent when the
provision of information is detrimental to patient well-being. The
second suggested alternative was a return to a paternalistic model of
medical practice, based on the relative expertise of doctors, in which
the patient is not always viewed as having decisional authority.
Subsequent discussion focused on four key areas, including (1)
the practice and theory of informed consent; (2) the appropriate
metaphor for the doctor–patient relationship; (3) the acceptability
of a return to ‘paternalism’; and (4) the role of oaths.
First, many participants who were practising health care profes-
sionals readily affirmed that the theoretical ideal of informed
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consent and informed choice is exceedingly difficult, if not impos-
sible, to enact in practice. In addition to familiar concerns about
the impossibility of giving, let alone processing, all relevant infor-
mation, real conflict could exist between acting in the patient’s
interest, respecting her rights and giving information. As an
example, a practitioner reported that her patients sometimes
expressed their wish that she had not given them certain informa-
tion. This raises a conflict between the duty of giving information
and the right not to know.
Second, there was discussion about what the right metaphor for
doctor–patient relations ought to be. Some suggested that
‘maternalism’ might be better than paternalism because it is sug-
gestive of a warmer, more empathetic and less authoritative or
authoritarian relationship. Others strongly objected to such sexist
metaphors: if anything, parentalism ought to be the term in use. It
was specifically noted – with strong emotion – that the term
‘paternalism’ abused an outmoded, sexist model to derogate and
dismiss attitudes of genuine concern for one’s patient.
But many thought that the parent–child relation is an unsuitable
metaphor for doctor–patient interaction in the first place because it
is so unequal. Some suggested that a friendship model – a model
that emphasizes equality, but also empathy and concern – would be
a better metaphor [27]. Others thought friendship was not quite
right since one ought not to befriend one’s patients; they favoured
an advocacy model.
Third, although it was widely acknowledged that informed
choice was not fit for guaranteeing protection of the patient’s best
interests or discharging the doctor’s duty of care, Bullock’s pro-
posal for relocating decision making with the health care profes-
sional met with mixed responses. Some pointed out that patients
are already able to waive informed consent or ask doctors to make
decisions for them – so no changes are needed here. Others pointed
out that whether new or old, the waiving of informed consent is
difficult to put into practice since the patient does not prospectively
know what information might benefit or harm his/her interests.
While nobody objected to the idea that patients have epistemic
handicaps, it was highlighted that health care professionals are
suffering from epistemic handicaps, too; they often labour under
pressures, such as exhaustion, insufficient time, targets and finan-
cial incentives. Nor should we assume that they are not influenced
by emotions or false risk perceptions; health care professionals may
be severely affected by and therefore overestimate the likelihood of
the rare but atrocious harms they witness during their career.
Finally, it was pointed out that informed consent has more roles
than ensuring patient’s best interests; it has an important legal role
in protecting doctors from charges of battery and assault. It also
has an important role in protecting patients’ autonomy rights to
refuse physical interventions. Thus, the (much more minimal)
requirement of informed consent as a means of protecting patients
and doctors might need to be separated from the role of informed
choice as a means of ensuring best outcomes. With respect to the
latter, there was a definite preference for rebalancing autonomy
with the duty of care under a nuanced model of trust and shared
decision making.
A separate strand of discussion focussed on the role of medical
oaths. On the one hand, it was queried whether such oaths are
voluntary, given that they are necessary to work as a doctor, and
whether taking an oath or adhering to a list of duties makes any
discernible difference to medical practice. For instance, both
Germany and Russia had statues for ethical medical research
before the outbreak of WWII. On the other hand, it was noted that
pledges have at least two important roles. First, taking an (outspo-
ken) pledge to do something makes one more likely to do what is
pledged; people who pledge not to give in to torture last longer
under torture, and people who share their New Year’s resolutions
with others are more likely to stick to them. Second, oaths have a
role in emphasizing and co-opting a long cultural tradition, thus
fostering cohesion, pride and trust in the medical profession.
At a deeper level, it was questioned why doctors, as opposed to
other service providers (for instance, plumbers and bankers), have
an oath. Does this follow from doctors being particularly unreli-
able – for, historically, oaths are often appealed to restore trust
after it has been breached? Or is it because of the level of their
expertise – the power and/or knowledge differential between
doctor and patients? Or is it rather because of the seriousness or
intimacy of the subject matter that we entrust them with? Although
in comparison to plumbers’ and doctors’ expertise, we may be
equally ignorant: plumbers at worst enter and flood our house;
doctors may enter and kill our bodies.
Session 3: evidence-based medicine
The third session was introduced by Professor Brian Hurwitz
(Professor of Medicine and the Arts, Department of English,
King’s College London). Hurwitz recounted his personal experi-
ence of creating and enacting the changing clinical practice of
antibiotic treatment for acute infectious conjunctivitis (AIC) to
then raise three topics for discussion: first, the role of clinical
expertise in determining best practice; two, the role of research
findings in determining clinical practice; and, three, the evolving
nature of the ‘evidence base’.
AIC is an infection of the conjunctiva of the eye that is very
painful, but often self-limiting. In 20% of children and 50% of
adults, the infection is of viral origin. Until 1995, the standard
treatment for AIC was the application of broad-spectrum antibiot-
ics in the form of chloramphenicol drops. A BMJ editorial in 1995
advised against this in view of deaths arising from bone marrow
aplasia directly related to the use of chloramphenicol [28,29].
In light of this publication, Hurwitz undertook meta-analyses of
heterogeneous randomized trials looking at the effectiveness of
antibiotics for AIC. Both the first and second meta-analysis found
AIC to be self-limiting, with no significant symptomatic benefits
of antibiotics; 65% of symptoms were cleared on days 2–5 with
the use of a placebo [30–32]. While topical antibiotics were found
to be of some benefit in improving early clinical and microbio-
logical remission, these benefits were significantly reduced in later
stages. In light of these findings, and ‘following the evidence’,
Hurwitz changed his clinical practice and no longer prescribed
chloramphenicol for conjunctivitis.
However, upon discovering that his patients were exceedingly
distressed by this change and by their unrelieved painful symp-
toms – which, as Hurwitz’ clinical observation, had seemed to
clear up quicker under antibiotics – Hurwitz reluctantly reversed
his practice back to prescribing chloramphenicol, thus following
his clinical observation and going ‘against the evidence’.
A later and bigger meta-analysis vindicated Hurwitz observa-
tion: although there was no difference between antibiotics and
non-antibiotics in outcome measures at day 3, in the treated group,
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symptoms did resolve themselves quicker, thus explaining his
observation of quicker symptom relief in his antibiotics-treated
patients [33].
On this basis, Hurwitz advocated a nuanced relationship
between evidence and practice, with a considerable role for clini-
cal judgment and expertise, and flexibility to determine the right
course of action in light of the patient’s circumstances; for some,
a few hours difference in onset of symptom relief might make a
world of difference, but for others, practically none. He also sug-
gested that while the ‘the evidence’ is sometimes definitive, it is
also often evolving and may not capture everything of note: it
failed to capture the notion of ‘onset of symptom relief’ and, in this
instance, it seemed the evidence had ‘lagged behind’ clinical
judgement.
Hurwitz’s discussion was followed by Dr Luis José Flores
(Department of Philosophy, King’s College London, and Depart-
ment of Psychiatry, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile), who
examined problems for the reasoning processes involved in justi-
fying the ‘hierarchy of evidence’ and in applying that hierarchy to
individual cases.
Evidence-based medicine’s so-called ‘Hierarchies of Evidence’
privilege evidence from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and
in particular meta-analyses (MAs) of RCTs above all other sources
of knowledge. Applying such knowledge to individual cases,
Flores pointed out, relies on the following inferential syllogism:
1 Meta-analyses/best evidence show that most cases of diagnosis
D respond to treatment T.
2 It is likely that the patient has D.
3 This is all I know about the matter.
C Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the patient will
respond to intervention T.
Using this syllogism, Flores argued, we can first see that the
strength of the conclusion depends on the certainty of premise 1,
which is dependent both on the strength and certainty of the
research findings, as well as the amount of trust we put into the
evidential sources. It is with respect to this premise that EBM,
through the use of its hierarchies, attempts to increase the strength
and reliability of the evidence base. But that is not all that deter-
mines the strength of the conclusion.
The above inference, Flores pointed out, also involves an infer-
ence from a group probability in (1) to an individual probability
(C). This, Flores, argued, is the problem of generalizability of
research findings, which has two aspects. First, this involves a
generalization of research findings from the research population to
the treatment population. These may not be identical; research
populations are often younger, more homogenous, more typical in
their presentation and with lower levels of co-morbidity than the
treatment populations. Second, it involves an inference from a
group probability to an individual probability. This is not an infer-
ence that has much warrant: a group displaying a certain correla-
tion can have very many members to whom this correlation does
not apply, or applies in reverse.
Such an inference is only warranted if it is the very best we can
do – if premise (3) is true and this is all we know about the matter.
But premise (3) is nearly always false: we know much more about
the matter at hand, and, in particular, we know details about our
individual patients.
Having explained thus far, Flores proposed two possible ways in
which EBM could improve on dealing with the generalizability
problem. The first is to make the research population more like the
target population/individual through, for example, pragmatic
trials, n = 1 trials and a refinement of reference classes. This solu-
tion would improve things, but it could not get rid of
generalizability problems. The second is to reject the idea, implicit
in the above syllogism that meta-analyses are our only and there-
fore ‘best guess’, and instead combine this knowledge with
other knowledge that we possess, including, for example,
clinical experience, data mining, subgroup analysis and
pathophysiological reasoning in order to arrive at a best guess
based on a combined knowledge source.
In the subsequent discussion, there was widespread agreement
that there is an intractable, insoluble problem of applying popula-
tion data to individual patients; evidence from RCTs gives prob-
ability, but no amount of RCT-based evidence can close the
inferential gap between population and individual. Further prob-
lems for a pure reliance of RCTs were noted: we do not need an
RCT to know that we need to act on obstructed tracheas and in the
case of other dramatic results, and RCTs are easily corrupted by
the powers that finance them through choice of outcome measures,
publication bias and other mechanisms that are well documented
in the literature [34].
A further theme in the discussion was the role of values in
individual treatment and in research; treating a patient must be
guided by what the patient wants, and that may not be what the
HCP think the patient wants, or what the researchers thought
patients would want. This linked in with two other points. First,
what looks like factual evidence is not chosen in a value-free way:
the outcomes of RCTs are fixed in factual terms, but how these
outcomes are formulated reflects the perceived desirability of dif-
ferent outcomes. Thus, the research in Hurwitz’ example focussed
on symptom resolution after 3 days, not on what was the patient-
relative outcome: the time-to-onset of noticeable pain relief. Had
the research taken that, or symptoms at 12 and 24 hours as an
outcome, it was suggested, Hurwitz might well have found a
discernible difference in his first meta-analysis. Similarly, it was
noted, claims about the ineffectiveness of antibiotics for other
common conditions such as otitis media and sore throat often refer
to symptom resolution after 5 days. But for children, and their
parents, what matters is the duration of the really painful bit – and
there even a couple of hours can make a huge difference, although
in a research paper that is unlikely to be taken as relevant. Simi-
larly, treatment outcomes often focus on ‘objective measures’,
such as a photo or a blood test, which may not correlate with the
outcome that matters for the patients. A second point was that
RCTs focus on large numbers and can therefore focus on generat-
ing results that can be made statistically significant. But, partici-
pants pointed out, these results may not be clinically significant:
they may not matter for individual people. This tied into a larger
worry about RCTs: that in forcing a particular framing of questions
– a focus on manipulable, single causes – it closes the door on
investigating important relationships that cannot so easily be fit
into that model, for example, long-term exposures to diffuse social
contexts.
There were also more critical voices of these lines of thought.
Some thought that in devising guidelines, factors were taken into
account – such as the development of antibiotics resistance –
which individual patients were unlikely to consider, but that, in
a nice link back to the first topic of the day, should be considered.
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With respect to clinical experience and Hurwitz’s case study, a
lively suggestion ensued. Some suggested that Hurwitz should not
have resorted to antibiotics, but simply to eye drops, which can
have a washing and pain-relieving effect. Since antibiotics are
administered as drops, part of their effect may have been due to
this. Placebo-controlled studies will have compared antibiotics not
with no treatment – which is what Hurwitz proceeded to offer his
patients – but with eye drops without AB. Another explanation,
offered by a long-practising GP, for the changing evidence was
that people have become a lot better at diagnosing conjunctivitis
during her lifetime: not every sticky eye is conjunctivitis anymore.
At the same time, it was thought that clinical experience is better
at picking up small effect sizes than is commonly acknowledged.
Session 4: person-centred medicine,
particularism and judgement
The final session opened with an introduction from Dr James
Appleyard (retired consultant paediatrician). Appleyard suggested
that the view that patients are persons is not mainstream. We
should consider patients as persons primarily because a patient is
limited in descriptiveness and implies lack of autonomy and
dependency; ‘patient’ characterizes a patient primarily as a suf-
ferer, which emphasizes only one aspect of the person. Histori-
cally, doctors have been patronizing to patients identifying them
with terms such as service user, client, consumer [35–37].
Appleyard adopted a four-part definition of person-centred
medicine: (1) medicine of the person (of the totality of the person’s
health including its ill and positive aspects); (2) medicine for the
person (promoting the fulfilment of the person’s life project); (3)
medicine by the person (with clinicians extending themselves as
full human beings well-grounded in science and high ethical aspi-
rations) and (4) medicine with the person (working respectfully in
collaboration and in an empowering manner through a partnership
of patients, family and clinicians) [38].
Treating a patient as a person, Appleyard maintains, prevents
HCP from treating disease primarily. This is important because the
social determinants of disease are overwhelming; if social factors
are not taken into account, treatment outcomes will not be satis-
factory. For example, research on the frequency of throat infec-
tions in children shows that there is a big correlation between
events in family and incidence of throat infections [39,40].
Person-centred medicine also involves the recognition that a
doctor is a person, too, with certain attributes, skills and values.
Ideally, doctors would be matched with the patient in terms of each
of their personal characteristics. Understanding the doctor as a
person facilitates a proper dialogical relationship with patient as a
person fostering connectedness and thereby enhancing patient
well-being.
Appleyard noted that the person-centred approach to medicine
is often thought to be associated with increased rather than
decreased resource utilization. However, studies from the Uni-
versity of Gothenburg and others show decreased utilization and
increasing patient satisfaction both in acute and chronic condi-
tions on the person-centred model. For instance, it was reported
in a study of patients admitted to hospital with hip fracture that
there were fewer medical complications and a 40% reduction in
average total cost with no readmissions [41]. Person-centred care
fosters a feeling of connectedness with an interpersonal outlook
of unity which promotes attitudes of hope, empathy and respect.
With the enhancement of well-being, drop out relapse and
recurrence rates in physical and mental disorders are reduced
[42,43].
Professor Jonathan Wolff (Professor of Philosophy, University
College London) explored the philosophical doctrine of moral
particularism as a route to developing an account of medical par-
ticularism. We are inclined to think, Wolff argued, that the purpose
of medicine is to cure disease, and that the reason we visit doctors
is to obtain a cure. But if that is so, he said, we are sorely disap-
pointed. Medicine very often does not have a cure, in fact until
quite recently, medicine pretty much failed to cure anything at all
[44–46]. Since the discovery of surgery and antibiotics, medicine
sometimes cures things, but even then our powers of diagnosis far
outstrip our curative powers [47].
Why is curing so difficult? One, common sense, answer is to
think that we simply do not know enough (yet). On this picture,
there could in principle be a manual to the human body, just as
there is a manual to your car. With this manual, describing the full
set of rules for how the body functions and dysfunctions, in hand,
we would understand everything about the human body, and could
cure it. But we just do not have (and may never be able to obtain)
that manual. In principle though, on this picture, the manual could
exist; thus our failure to cure is an epistemic failure.
There is, however, another way to think about the human body,
Wolff suggested. This idea, medical particularism, is inspired by
the approach to philosophical ethics called ‘moral particularism’.
Moral particularism maintains that we cannot give a full set of
rules that accurately describe, or from which we can deduce, the
moral facts in every situation. Thus, a moral judge needs far more
than a set of rules or principles to proceed. These, at best, serve as
a set of crutches or a stepping stone, but would lead to moral error
if universally and rigidly applied [48].
Similarly, a medical particularist would not assume that every-
thing fits neatly together – that there is or could be a manual for the
human body – and will have to proceed in absence of such a
rulebook. Thus, a medical judge, too, would need far more than a
range of medical principles, rules, regularities or research findings
and the ability to apply them to be a good medical judge. If
medical particularism is a plausible approach to medicine, then
that gives a reason to reject the simple or rigid application of
evidence-based rules of guidelines, and may give a justification for
person-centred medicine.
In the following discussion, there was a notable enthusiasm for
the move towards person-centred medicine and away from the
increasing depersonalization of patients to biological entities. It
was speculated that person-centred medicine has the potential to
achieve better diagnoses. For instance, if one were to consider in
the context of the patient as a person whether a test was needed (as
opposed to relying on EBM), HCP are likely to give a more timely
diagnosis to their patients.
Two central concerns with person-centred medicine and
medical particularism were discussed in detail. First, there was
some apprehension that personalized and particularist approaches
to medicine presuppose a careful ongoing relationship between the
patient and doctor. It was noted that the success of moral particu-
larism depends on having an attuned moral sensitivity that can
only be developed over time. However, the ability to develop an
analogous ‘medical’ sensitivity towards patients does not fit with
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the current realities of health care and primary care management,
which are constrained in terms of time and finance.
Participants were also concerned with the complexity of
medical particularism. While it was agreed that this approach
correctly identifies the inadequacies of reductionist or generalist
approaches to medicine, it remains unclear how all of the particu-
lar features of an individual patient can be taken into consideration
in the medical setting. A possible solution to this was suggested in
the form of a requirement that HCP work within a supportive
network and have a significant amount of information about the
particular patient they are treating. It was disputed as to whether
this solution was itself practically feasible.
In light of the current socio-economic difficulties of fostering
long-term relationships between HCP and patients, the discussion
concluded with the suggestion that general principles are in fact
needed. However, while being necessary, it was agreed that
general medical principles should not be treated as sufficient for
correct medical practice and should play more of a subservient role
than they currently do. For this reason, person-centred medicine
was recognized as an attractive alternative, allowing HCP to apply
informed general theories in a way that is sensitive to each
patient’s particular needs.
Conclusions
As with the previous four workshops in the series, the fifth CHH
interdisciplinary philosophy and medicine workshop was a huge
success. Throughout the day, there was a balanced discussion
between clinicians and philosophers, unhindered by terminologi-
cal confusion; only one request for terminological clarification
was raised. The central outcome of the day was a significant
support for a move towards more person-centric medicine. This
was apparent in discussions relating to both of the two key areas of
the workshop: medical knowledge and medical duties.
Under the heading of ‘Medical Knowledge’, it was widely agreed
that general principles are inadequate for providing appropriate
patient care. Session 3 emphasized the failures of EBM to identify
the best (or, the least worst) medical treatment for individual
patients. First, the aims of RCTs were thought to be at odds with
what matters for the patient, who generally prefer to know how long
their symptoms will be painful as opposed to how long their overall
condition will last. Second, it was noted that population studies
cannot address the particular needs of the individual. While this
problem was thought to be intractable, it was also believed that an
appropriate solution was to give more control to the clinician’s
judgement. The level of clinical judgement needed was expanded
upon in discussions in session 4 with the model of person-centred
medicine. Here, it was argued that clinical judgement can be better
informed by treating patients as individual persons. It was specu-
lated that as a result of adopting this model, HCP will reach more
accurate diagnoses and deliver better treatment.
The second central area of discussion on ‘Medical Knowledge’
related to controversies over the credibility of research backing flu
vaccination schemes. Discussion in session 1 emphasized the need
for HCP to use their clinical judgement, but this time in terms of
the obligations they have towards themselves; HCP should have
the freedom to question the validity of research backing vaccina-
tion schemes, such as whether the research is biased, before com-
mitting to the schemes.
This focus on the importance of clinical judgement bore a direct
relationship to discussions on the professional duties that HCP
have towards themselves and the ethical duties that they have
towards their patients. In the context of the discussion on manda-
tory vaccination programmes, it was argued that a degree of HCP
autonomy remained important. Some even suggested that HCP are
obliged to criticize policies with an inadequate evidence base.
With respect to patients and the HCP’s ethical duties, it was agreed
that a real conflict exists between respecting patient autonomy and
acting under the duty of care, with the ideal of informed consent
being impossible to enact in practice. It was suggested that there is
a need to rebalance autonomy with the duty of care under a model
of trust and shared decision making.
Overall, the workshop provided significant support for a move-
ment towards more nuanced models of applying and gaining
medical knowledge in both medical research and therapeutic con-
texts. On the basis of the difficulties of implementing these more
complex models, and the duties they entail, a further workshop
was planned on ‘Parentalism and Trust’ in medicine (June, 2014).
This workshop would provide more focus on the ethical and
epistemic privileges of clinical judgement and the clinician’s rela-
tionship with the patient. The title of the workshop, ‘Parentalism
and Trust’, was chosen to reflect concern arising during the work-
shop that the term paternalism has unfortunate sexist and authori-
tative connotations. It was advised that the workshop on
‘Parentalism’ should address the persistent concern of the day: that
in order for clinical judgement to successfully buffer the inadequa-
cies of EBM, and for person-centred medicine to achieve good
treatment outcomes, a trusting relationship between the HCP and
the patient is needed.
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